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1 INTRODUCTION 
In August 2007, the Australian Corporate Governance Council (ACGC) issued the second 
edition of its Principles and Recommendations (ACGC-PR) for enhancing the corporate 
governance structure of Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed companies. Australian 
listed companies are required to prepare corporate governance statements that disclose the 
extent of their compliance with these principles and recommendations using an “if not, why 
not” approach that requires them to explain the circumstances underpinning their decision not 
to comply with particular Principles or Recommendations. This study examines the level of 
compliance by Australian listed companies with the ACGC-PR and investigates whether 
companies with higher levels of compliance engage in lower levels of earnings management. 
The focus is on the controlling function of the ACGC-PR through investigating the 
association with accrual-based earnings management. This paper contributes to the earnings 
management literature in two ways. First, prior research suggests that managers use 
discretionary accruals to manage certain benchmarks such as the level of earnings (see 
Dechow et al. 1995). This study demonstrates how corporate governance intervention 
influences firms in the management of manage earnings benchmarks. In particular the study 
results suggest that, post ACGC-PR, there is evidence of an association between a high level 
of compliance with the principles and recommendations and a low level of earnings 
management. Second, the ACGC-PR were designed to direct and control corporate 
governance. Since the ACGC-PR represent a mechanism aimed at improving outcomes for 
investors (referred to as ‘Principals’ within the agency theory paradigm), then investors have 
incentives to identify and reward compliance with the ACGC-PR. The results in this study 
suggest that the ACGC-PR is associated with a decrease in discretionary accrual actions by 
high level compliers, and is arguably an effective method of addressing the agency problem. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides an explanation of the 
link between corporate governance mechanisms and the agency problem, while Section 3 
provides a review of related literature and develops the hypothesis tested in this study. In 
Section 4 the research method and sample selection approach are described, and the modified 
Jones model is presented. In Section 5 the results are presented and discussed. Section 6 
provides a conclusion and some implications for future research. 
 
2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE AGENCY PROBLEM 
While there is no single generally accepted definition for corporate governance, a system by 
which a company is directed and controlled (Cadbury 1992; Hodges, Wright & Keasey 1996) 
appears to be the most common understanding proposed to describe corporate governance. 
The focus of this study is on controlling role of corporate governance, as the study offers an 
explanation for the link between corporate governance and the “agency problem” which is 
attributed to the separation between managers and principals, the separation of levels of 
management, and the conflicts of interest between managers and equity and debt holders 
(Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2005; Dechow et al. 2012; Fama & Jensen 1983a, 
1983b; Stolowy & Breton 2004).  
 
Earnings management is the discretionary manipulation of earnings levels by managers. 
Managers can choose from among the available accounting options to align their earnings 
levels with their intentions (Stolowy & Breton 2004; Tucker & Zarowin 2006). Earnings 
management manipulation occurs within the boundaries of accounting standards and the law. 
The benchmark for distinguishing between the activities that constitute earnings management 
and those that do not depends on the intentions of the manager choosing the accounting 
standards (McVay 2006). Earnings management studies are predominantly based on the 
assumption that managers behave opportunistically. Therefore, from the agency perspective 
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regarding corporate governance, monitoring managers is considered a necessity (Benkel, 
Mather & Ramsay 2006; Brennan 2008; Bugshan 2005; Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 
2005; Koh 2003). According to this viewpoint, using corporate governance to improve the 
internal and external control of managers (for example, by monitoring the board of directors) 
may decrease opportunities for earnings management and improve the credibility of financial 
information (Dey 2005; Rogers 2006). From a rational standpoint, earnings management is a 
consequence of the agency problem and it can be mitigated by a good corporate governance 
structure. In other words, good corporate governance principles and recommendations can be 
considered a means of controlling managers in the realm of monitoring and bonding costs. 
 
The major aim of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 
establishing its Principles of Good Corporate Governance is to mitigate the agency problem 
that is caused by the separation of owners and managers (Sharar 2006). Previous research 
suggests that firms with high residual agency losses attempt to mitigate these costs by 
engaging in monitoring activities through a board or audit committee as part of an internal 
corporate governance mechanism (Benkel, Mather & Ramsay 2006; Bugshan 2005; Chi et al. 
2009; Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2005). Corporate governance exercises two 
opposite effects on agency costs: it increases monitoring and bonding costs, and it decreases 
residual losses. A pragmatic motive for implementing corporate governance practice is lied 
under this assumption that benefits outweigh costs of implementation. 
 
3 LITERATURE REVIEW AND STUDY HYPOTHESIS 
While a large number of the studies of earnings management focus on the opportunistic use 
of accruals, there are relatively few studies investigating the association between corporate 
governance codes/ principles and earnings management resulting from the use of 
discretionary accruals. A few studies have been conducted that examine overall compliance 
levels with the Corporate Governance Codes in South Africa (Ntim et al. 2012), Romania 
(Dănescu & Spătăcean 2011) and England (Selvaggi & Upton 2008). These studies did not 
examine the link between the aggregate level of compliance with corporate governance 
principles and earnings management practices. Chang and Sun (2009) used aggregate 
corporate governance scores consisting of five corporate governance attributes 
recommended in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (2002) (SOX) to investigate the association 
between overall corporate governance and earnings management for a sample of companies 
in the United States (US). They argued that an optimal corporate governance structure is 
formed by taking into account multiple complementary CG dimensions. To date, no study 
has been located that has focused on the aggregate level of compliance with the ACGC-PR 
and an association with earnings management. 
 
This study examines the aggregate influence of 27 recommendations introduced under the 
eight corporate governance principles. These principles that are discussed in this section 
include: 1. management functions and oversight; 2. board structure; 3. ethics; 4. audit 
committee, 5. timely and balanced disclosure; 6. rights of shareholders; 7. risk management; 
and 8. remuneration. The study seeks to investigate the association between these attributes 
(in aggregate) and earnings management. Prior research suggests that accruals are one of the 
most commonly used proxies for earnings management (Benkel, Mather & Ramsay 2006; 
Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2005; DeAngelo 1986; Hsu & Koh 2005; Jones 1991; 
Koh 2003; Kothari, Leone & Wasley 2005). Classification shifting within income statements 
is another proxy for earnings management (Healy & Wahlen 1999). In addition, the timing of 
sales, understating the cost of goods sold, and reducing discretionary expenses such as 
research and development, advertising and some sales and administrative expenses have also 
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been identified as proxies for real earnings management (Cohen, J, Krishnamoorthy & 
Wright 2008; Fama & Jensen 1983b; Koh 2003; Patel, Balic & Bwakira 2002).  
 
3.1 ACGC Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 
In this section the Principles and Recommendations proposed by the ACGC are discussed 
briefly and the testable hypothesis for this study is developed. 
 
3.1.1 Management functions and oversight (Principle 1) and earnings management 
Principle 1 deals with the roles and responsibilities of boards and management. Companies 
are encouraged to distinguish between ‘the functions reserved to the board and those 
delegated to senior executives’ and disclose ‘the process for evaluating the performance of 
senior executives’ (ACGC 2007, pp. 13-5). The OECD (2004) suggests that the purpose of 
evaluating management performance is to enable shareholders to have access to ‘relevant 
information on a timely and regular basis’ (Sharar 2006, p. 75). Feltham and Xie (1994) 
argue that tying managers’ performance to their compensation can offer incentives for 
managers to improve their performance and that it has become common to measure 
managers’ performance using financial numbers (RiskMetrics 2010). Critically, when 
performance is measured by financial numbers, there is an incentive for managers to 
manipulate the numbers to earn more. Feltham and Xie (1994) propose multiple measures, 
both performance-based and accounting-based, for evaluating performance. Patel, Balic and 
Bwakira (2002) suggest that disclosing the senior executive functions and the process of 
evaluating executive directors’ performance, recommended under Principle 1, is likely to 
improve transparency and reduce information asymmetry. Further, Richardson’s (2000) 
results indicate that greater levels of information asymmetry yield greater levels of earnings 
management.  
 
3.1.2 Board structure (Principle 2) and earnings management 
Board structure (BS) is the focus of P2, which indicates that ‘companies should have a 
board of an effective composition, size and commitment to adequately discharge its 
responsibilities and duties’ (ACGC 2007, p. 16). The composition and size of boards of 
directors have been broadly investigated by scholars for their impact on enhancing the 
effectiveness of the boards’ monitoring role and in mitigating the agency problem (Bedard, 
Chtourou & Courteau 2004; Bédard & Gendron 2010; Cheng & Warfield 2005; Cohen, J, 
Krishnamoorthy & Wright 2008; Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2005; Finnerty 
1976; Jaffe 1974; Jensen 1993; Klein 2002b; Merchant & Rockness 1994; Xie, Davidson & 
DaDalt 2003). A board’s effectiveness is also described as its ability to prevent managers 
from making decisions that conflict with stakeholder interests (Jo & Kim 2007). The 
composition of the board appears to be correlated with the likelihood that managers will 
engage in earnings management (Lobo & Zhou 2001). 
 
3.1.3 Ethics (Principle 3) and earnings management 
Principle 3 seeks to encourage ethical promotion and responsible decision-making in 
companies. It concentrates on the establishment of a code of conduct and on insider trading 
policies, and indicates that ‘companies should actively promote ethical and responsible 
decision making’ (ACGC 2007, p. 21). Disclosing ethical issues or adopting codes of 
conduct are strongly supported by diverse participants including shareholders and boards 
(Epstein, McEwen & Spindle 1994; Jongsureyapart 2006). Beneish and Vargus (2002) 
examined whether insiders engage in income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings 
management in order to benefit from buying and selling their own shares and found a 
relationship between earnings management and abnormal insider trading. They identified 
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overstated earnings in the years before instances of insider selling and decreases in income in 
the years before instances of abnormal insider buying. Cheng and Warfield (2005) defend the 
proposition that abnormal insider trading rises just prior to increasing share prices, which is 
consistent with Beneish and Vargus’s (2002) findings. Aboody, Hughes and Liu (2005)  
investigated the relationship between insider trading, earnings quality and the cost of capital. 
They applied earnings quality as a proxy for information asymmetry and measured earnings 
quality by discretionary accruals (DA) using the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan & 
Sweeney 1995). 
 
3.1.4 Audit committee (Principle 4) and earnings management 
Principle 4, ‘Safeguard integrity in financial reporting’ is focused on audit committee 
characteristics, and the first Recommendation under this Principle suggests that ‘the 
board should establish an audit committee’ (ACGC 2007, p. 25). The influence of various 
characteristics of audit committees including the committee’s existence, the independence of 
the committee directors, the presence of executive directors and individuals with financial 
expertise on the committee and the committee’s meeting frequency and size, have been the 
subject of numerous prior studies. Klein (2002a) demonstrated a significant negative 
relationship between an independent member majority in audit committees and abnormal 
accruals. Benkel, Mather and Ramsay (2006) asserted that a higher portion of independent 
directors on audit committees yields diminutive levels of earnings management. Davidson, 
Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2005) provided evidence of a negative association between the 
existence of an audit committee and a majority of non- executive director committee 
members on reducing earnings management.  
 
3.1.5 Timely and balanced disclosure (Principle 5) and earnings management 
Principle 5 focuses on disclosure quality and accountability: ‘companies should promote 
timely and balanced disclosure of all material matters concerning the company’ (ACGC 
2007, p. 28). Two important aspects of disclosure considered in Principle 5 are 
‘timeliness’ and the ‘nature’ of disclosure. The Principle states that the disclosures should 
ideally be factual, objective and consist of all material information, and that the information 
should eliminate the ‘surprise’ factor. In addition, the type of information, and who is in 
charge of deciding about the disclosures must be provided, and the monitoring of compliance 
are issues that must be considered in a companies’ continuous disclosure policies. Prior 
research suggests that reducing information asymmetry is one of the potential benefits of 
disclosure (Lang & Lundholm 1996; Lobo & Zhou 2001).  Jo and Kim (2007) support the 
notion that entities with extensive and frequent disclosure are less likely to engage in 
earnings management due to reducing information asymmetry and enhancing transparency. 
Dye (1988)  introduces information asymmetry between managers and shareholders and 
between investors and prospective investors as two factors that generate earnings 
management. Similarly, Richardson (2000) showed a significant positive association between 
information asymmetry levels and earnings management. Hirst and Hopkins (1998)  and 
Hunton, Libby and Mazza (2006) argue that detecting earnings management will be 
facilitated by providing more transparent disclosure that enhances financial analysts’ 
judgments. 
 
3.1.6 Rights of shareholders (Principle 6) and earnings management 
Under Principle 6, enhancing and exercising the rights of shareholders is considered a good 
corporate governance practice. Principle 6 states: ‘companies should respect the rights of 
shareholders and facilitate the effective exercise of those rights’ (ACGC 2007, p. 31). In 
Principle 6, companies are encouraged to design a communication strategy that promotes 
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effective communication with shareholders and to promote participation at general meetings 
(ACGC 2007, p.30). 
 
The association between the rights of shareholders and earnings management has been a 
controversial subject; with conflicting results emerging. Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (1988) 
compare earnings management activities in 31 countries. They identify several country-level 
characteristics that they suggest, have reduced earnings management: a “developed equity 
market, dispersed ownership structure, strong investors’ rights and legal enforcement”. In 
contrast, Martin (2001; 2003) suggests that strong shareholder rights may result in greater 
earnings management as there are internal and external demands that lead to earnings 
management. Ding, Zhang and Zhang (2007), and Liu and Lu (2007)  introduce conflicts of 
interest between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders as a leading cause of 
earnings management in China. Liu and Lu (2007) provide evidence supporting the role of 
good corporate governance on constraining agency conflicts between minority shareholders 
and controlling shareholders and eventually on mitigating earnings management. 
 
3.1.7 Risk management (Principle 7) and earnings management 
Principle 7 states that ‘companies should establish a sound system of risk oversight and 
management and internal control’ (ACGC 2007, p. 12). Opportunistic behaviour may 
influence risk-related decisions among managers, especially when the compensation that 
managers receive includes bonuses that are based on reported earnings. For instance Mayers 
and Smith (1982) suggested that managers may prefer to postpone expenditure, including that 
associated with insurance which is considered to decrease risk, until a time at which they may 
no longer be working with the company based on their contracts. The influence of internal 
audit as a component of a corporate governance structure which reduces earnings 
management is apparent in some studies (for example in Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 
2005). Further, disclosing risk management policies is expected to mitigate earnings 
management by improving transparency and decreasing information asymmetry. 
 
3.1.8 Remuneration (Principle 8) and earnings management 
Principle 8 states that ‘companies should ensure that the level and composition of 
remuneration is sufficient and reasonable and that its relationship to performance is clear’ 
(ACGC 2007, p. 35), and it contains a recommendation that a board establish a remuneration 
committee with responsibility for recruitment, termination policies, incentives and 
frameworks for superannuation arrangements (ACGC 2007). Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006) suggest that some payment structures that are supposed to enhance company 
performance motivate managers to manipulate their earnings to increase their compensation. 
Their findings indicate that when manager remuneration is tied to share prices, the manager 
will engage in earnings management in an attempt to change the price of the company’s 
stock. Main and Johnston (1993) define the primary task of remuneration committees as 
establishing payment policies based on corporate performance. However, they argue that 
compensation is higher when a remuneration committee is in place but that there is no effect 
on the incentive structure of pay. Klein (2002a) evinces the positive relationship between a 
CEO sitting on a remuneration committee and a higher level of earnings management. 
 
3.2 Hypothesis Tested In This Study 
Investigating the association between the extent of compliance with aggregate corporate 
governance principles and recommendations and earnings management leads to the 
development of the study’s hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 1 (H1): Companies with higher levels of aggregate compliance with the 
ACGC-PR will exhibit lower levels of discretionary accruals (DA). 
 
4 DATA COLLECTION AND SAMPLING 
To test the hypothesis for the study, stratified random sampling is conducted using all of the 
ASX listed companies except for financial companies and those that belong to industries with 
fewer than 10 firms. Consistent with prior research, firms in the financial sector were 
eliminated in this study since due to their nature (Bugshan 2005) and unique working capital 
structure (Davidson, Goodwin- Stewart & Kent 2005), it is difficult to estimate discretionary 
and non-discretionary accruals for firms in this sector (Klein 2002a). The requirement for 
eliminating industries with less than 10 firms was introduced in prior research by Peasnell, 
Pope and Young (2000) who claim that elimination of these industries is necessary to 
estimate the specific parameters of the non-discretionary accruals models for each industry-
year. 
 
The Bloomberg database is used to collect the financial data that are necessary to calculate 
the accruals. The primary population for this study is the 1,886 listed companies included in 
the Bloomberg database for 2009 and 2010. After financial companies and those in industries 
with fewer than 10 firms have been excluded, 1,619 companies in total remain in the 
population (refer to Table 1). This population of 1,619 listed companies is used to compute 
the coefficients of the modified Jones model using a cross-sectional approach, and to 
calculate discretionary and non-discretionary accruals (used as a proxy for earnings 
management). For the hypothesis testing, a sample of 107 companies and 214 firm-year 
observations is randomly selected. Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for the percentage of 
the compliance of the primary sample companies with each ACGC-PR. These percentages 
are based on the number of recommendations that are relevant to each principle and that the 
company complies with. The numbers are then converted into percentages based on the total 
number of recommendations within each principle. 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of the sample by industry groups 
 
Description    N 
ASX-listed companies (24 industries)    1886 
Eliminate: Companies in the financial industries (4 industries)   (262) 
Eliminate: Industries with less than 10 companies (3 industries)   (5) 
Population (17 industries)    1619 
Final sample companies      107 
Firm-year observations 2009–2010    214 
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Table 2: Descriptive statics for level of compliance with corporate governance principles 
Corporate  
governance  
principle 
2009a 2010a Pooled 2009 and 2010b
Min% Max% Mean% Min% Max% Mean% Min% Max% Mean% 
P1 0 100 95.9  0 100 95.2  0 100 95.6 
P2 17 100 65.7  17 100 66.1  17 100 65.9 
P3 67 100 99.2  67 100 98.9  67 100 99.1 
P4 0 100 72.4  0 100 72.6  0 100 72.6 
P5 50 100 99.0  50 100 98.6  50 100 98.8 
P6 0 100 96.0  0 100 96.7  0 100 96.4 
P7 25 100 93.8  25 100 95.2  25 100 94.5 
P8 0 100 80.9  0 100 81.1  0 100 81.0 
TOTCOM 40.7 100 84.4  40.7 100 84.6  40.7 100 84.5 
a. N = 107 (2009), (2010); b. N = 214 (2009 & 2010). 
 
5 RESULTS ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Multiple regression models were used to test the research hypothesis that companies with 
higher levels of compliance with ACGC-PR will exhibit lower levels of discretionary 
accruals (earnings management). The independent variable is the level of compliance of each 
firm-year observation with 27 recommendations under the eight corporate governance 
principles. The dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals measured 
using the modified Jones model. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) compared Jones, the 
modified Jones and the Industry models and concluded that the most powerful model for 
measuring discretionary accruals is the modified Jones model. This model has since been 
commonly used to calculate discretionary accruals (see for example Bowman & Navissi 
2003, and Cohen, Dey & Lys 2008) and is adopted in this study as a measure to separate the 
discretionary portion of accruals from non-discretionary accruals. To find the discretionary 
accruals it is necessary to calculate total accruals and non-discretionary accruals. In the next 
two subsections the calculation of total accruals and non-discretionary accruals is explained. 
5.1 Evaluation of Total Accruals 
The balance sheet approach is commonly used to calculate total accruals (Bowman & Navissi 
2003; Bugshan 2005; Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2005; Kothari, Leone & Wasley 
2005). Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables that are required to 
calculate the total accruals using a balance sheet approach for the 2009-10 using the 
following model: 
 
TA t = (ΔCAt - ΔCASHt - ΔCLt + ΔSTLt – DEPt)  
Where: 
TA =Total accruals 
ΔCAt =Changes in current assets 
Δ CASHt =Changes in cash and cash equivalents 
Δ CLt =Changes in current liabilities 
Δ STLt =Changes in the short-term portion of long-term liabilities 
DEPt =Amount of depreciation and amortisation 
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For 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively, the average total assets are $492.3 million, $510 
million and $530.8 million (Table 3). For the 1,619 companies in the population, the average 
cash and cash equivalents for 2008, 2009 and 2010 are $31.4 million, $46.8 million and $50.1 
million, respectively. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics—total accruals 
  Mean* Minimum* Maximum* Median* Std. deviation* 
A8(2008) 492.289 .003 89616 18.512 3624.95 
A9 (2009) 510.008 .000 97236 16.921 3814.23 
A10 (2010) 530.759 .000 112402 18.975 4167.63 
CA8 128.554 .000 21680 7.341 868.21 
CA9 131.386 .000 22486 5.253 918.27 
CA10 134.447 .000 25134 6.061 994.00 
CASH8 31.420 –.014 4237 3.595 180.69 
CASH9 46.828 –.000 10833 2.695 363.35 
CASH10 50.092 –2.450 12456 3.117 448.64 
CL8 109.666 .000 22100 1.740 857.68 
CL9 94.920 .000 11850 1.643 584.34 
CL10 91.231 .000 13042 1.972 621.92 
Δ STL9 –8.992 -9187 2955 .000 284.95 
Δ STL10 –4.354 -2936 1333 .000 153.38 
DEP9 19.683 .000 4390 .143 185.50 
DEP10 20.039 .000 4732 .133 196.45 
TA9 –24.356 –7381 1558 –.194 258.85 
 TA10 –21.838 –7381 636 –.179 266.82 
* $m., before applying outlier tests 
TAt = (Δ CAt – Δ CASHt – Δ CLt + Δ STLt – DEPt) 
 
5.2 Evaluation of Non-discretionary Accruals 
To calculate non-discretionary accruals using the modified Jones regression model (below 
formula), the industry year-specific parameters are needed. There are two methods to 
compute the industry year-specific parameters: the time-series and cross-sectional approaches 
(Benkel, Mather & Ramsay 2006; Bugshan 2005; Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2005; 
Dechow, P.M., Sloan & Sweeney 1995; Dey 2005; Koh 2003; Scott 1997). The time-series 
approach uses firm-specific parameters instead of industry-specific parameters and assumes 
that firm-specific parameters do not vary over time (Bowman & Navissi 2003; Bugshan 
2005). This approach uses a lower number of observations and generates a smaller sample 
compared with the cross-sectional approach (Subramanyam, 1996). Under the more generally 
used cross-sectional approach, industry-time specific parameters are estimated assuming that 
these coefficients are the same for firms in the same industry-year (ACGC 2007; Bugshan 
2005; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Peasnell, Pope & Young 2000; Stolowy & Breton 2004). 
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Using a cross-sectional approach, the first regression of a modified Jones model is run 
separately for each industry-year to estimate the mentioned parameters (Watts & Zimmerman 
1990). 
 
Modified Jones Model 
TA t / At-1 = α1 (1 /At-1) + α2 (ΔREV t/At-1) + α3 (PPE t / At-1) + et 
Where: 
TA  = Total accruals 
A = Total assets 
ΔREV = Changes in revenue   
PPE = Gross property, plants and equipment 
 
Total accruals presented in Table 3 were applied in the modified Jones model to calculate the 
industry-year specific parameters. Tables 4 and 5 provide a summary of the descriptive 
statistics for the industry-year specific parameters that are estimated using a modified Jones 
model. The positive mean of α2 and the negative mean of α3 obtained for both 2009 and 2010 
are consistent with the results of prior research and confirm the usefulness of the modified 
Jones model in categorising total accruals into discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. 
The average R2 values for the 17 industries are 0.35 and 0.29 for the years 2009 and 2010 
respectively. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for estimating specific coefficients for 2009 using the 
modified Jones model 
  Mean Minimum Maximum Median Std. deviation 
R2 0.353 0.018 0.830 0.252 0.272 
α1 13865.72 –689443.00 1583978.65 –16869.86 497592.10 
α2 0.094 –0.106 0.465 0.057 0.158 
α3 –0.086 –0.352 0.129 –0.065 0.126 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for estimating specific coefficients for 2010 using the 
Modified Jones model 
Mean Minimum Maximum Median Std. deviation 
R2 0.291 0.030 0.820 . 1930 0.234 
α1 –32795.81 –795343.53 692283.09 10341.91 381901.00 
α2 0.004 –0.420 0.330 0.023 0.186 
α3 –0.019 –0.190 0.270 -0.031 0.130 
After estimating specific industry-year parameters, those parameters were applied to calculate 
the non-discretionary proportion of total accruals for each firm-year using the following 
formula: 
 
NDA t= α1 (1 /At-1) + α2 [ΔREV t- ΔREC t) /At-1] + α3 (PPE t / At-1), 
Where: 
NDA = Non-discretionary accruals 
A = Total assets 
ΔREV = Changes in revenue 
ΔREC = Changes in net receivables 
PPE = Gross property, plants and equipment 
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The final stage in applying the modified Jones model was to calculate the discretionary 
accruals by deducting the non-discretionary accruals from total accruals using the following 
formula: 
DAt = TA t / At-1 - NDAt 
Where: 
DA = Discretionary accruals 
TA = Total accruals 
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for calculating discretionary accruals* 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. deviation 
TA9 / At-1 –5.55 138.33 0.09 –0.02 3.92 
TA10 / At-1 –38.57 106.03 0.02 –0.02 3.36 
NDA9 –1.02 0.78 –0.02 –0.01 0.10 
NDA10 –2.17 3.51 0.10 0.00 0.48 
DA9 –5.64 1.72 –0.04 –0.02 0.28 
DA10 –3.64 2.32 –0.12 –0.03 0.51 
absDA9 0.00 5.64 0.12 0.07 0.26 
absDA10 0.00 3.64 0.25 0.09 0.46 
N = 1619  
*Before applying outlier tests 
 
5.3 Independent Variable –Compliance with the ACGC-PR 
The aggregate compliance with ACGC-PR was calculated by counting the number of 
recommendations a company followed out of the 27 available and converting the count into a 
percentage. The regression model developed to test the hypothesis is as follows: 
 
DA j= γ0 + TOTCOMt + γ8SIZEjt + LEVjt + ABSNIBEjt + PBRjt + ABSCHjt + εj  
Where: 
DA  = Absolute value of discretionary accruals 
TOTCOM = Total compliance with Australian corporate governance principles and 
recommendations (Percentage) 
SIZE  = Log of total assets 
LEV  = Leverage, ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
ABSNIBE = Absolute value of net income  
PBR  = Price to book ratio of equity  
ABSCH = Absolute changes in income  
 
The selection of control variables model included in the model is informed by a review of 
relevant literature. In testing the association between discretionary accruals and corporate 
governance factors Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2005) examine seven control 
variables: (1) size (log of total assets); (2) leverage (i.e., total liabilities divided by total 
assets); (3) equity ratios; (4) the absolute value of net income (a proxy for absolute net 
income before extraordinary items are divided by the total assets); (5) absolute changes in net 
income (a proxy for the absolute changes in income deflated by the total assets); (6) extreme 
performance (performance as measured by the net income divided by the total assets); and, 
(7) the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholders. They were unable to identify 
significant relationships between the absolute value of discretionary accruals and either 
extreme performance or the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholders. However, 
they provide evidence that the other control variables are significantly associated with the 
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absolute value of discretionary accruals. All of the statistically significant control variables 
mentioned in Davidson et al. (2005) are adopted in the current study. 
 
Table 7 provides descriptive statistics for the regression model that investigated the effect of 
the level of compliance of the study sample of companies with ACGC-PR on the level of 
discretionary accruals. The model controls for the effect of five control variables. Descriptive 
statistics are provided for one dependent variable (discretionary accruals), one independent 
variable (compliance with ACGC-PR) and five control variables (size, leverage, the absolute 
value of net income, the price to book ratio of equity, and the absolute change in income). 
The minimum and maximum absolute values of the discretionary accruals for the sample 
companies are .00 and 0.44, respectively. The minimum rate of compliance in this study is 
40.74%, and the maximum and mean are 100% and 85.29%, respectively. In Table 8, the 
Pearson correlation matrix for the dependent and independent variables is presented. The 
results demonstrate a positive and significant correlation between size and the level of 
compliance. 
 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation 
absDA 0.00 0.44 0.09 0.09 
TOTCOM%* 40.74 100.00 85.29 11.87 
LEV 0.00 1.21 0.249 0.24 
SIZE 5.62 9.87 7.49 0.78 
ABSNIBE 0.00 1.29 0.22 0.27 
ABSCH 0.00 1.82 0.18 0.27 
PBR -3.66 10.36 1.88 1.82 
* TOTCOM is the aggregate compliance with the CGPR. 
 
Table 8: Pearson correlation matrix between the independent variables 
N = 182  TOTCOM SIZE  LEV  ABSNIBE ABSCH PBR  
 
TOTCOM 
Pearson 1         
Sig. 
 
SIZE 
Pearson .532**  1       
 Sig. .000   
 
LEV 
Pearson .338** .344**  1     
 Sig. .000 .000   
 
ABSNIBE 
Pearson –.237** –.467** .027 1    
 Sig. .001 .000 .715   
 
ABSCH 
Pearson –.126 –.315** .057 .375** 1   
 Sig. .089 .000 .446 .000   
 
PBR 
Pearson .086 -.079 .085 .382** .152*  1 
 Sig. .247 .286 .253 .000 .041   
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
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In Table 9 the regression results are reported. Overall, the model is significant (F = 11.115, 
p<.01) and explains 27.6% of the variance in the dependent variable, DA (R2 =.276). The 
explanatory level of variation generated by the model is consistent with prior studies (see 
Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2005). The coefficient for total compliance is 
significantly negative (-.001, p< .05). Therefore, the hypothesis is supported. The coefficient 
for size (proxied by the log of total assets) is also negative and significant (-.024, p <.05), 
which is consistent with prior research. Finally, the coefficient for leverage is positive and 
significant (0.169, p< .001). 
 
Table 9: Multiple regression results and coefficients 
 
DA j= γ0 + γ1 TOTCOMjt + γ2SIZEjt + γ3LEVjt + γ4ABSNIBEjt + γ5ABSCHjt + γ6PBR + εj 
 
 Unstandardised co-
efficients 
Standardised 
co-efficients 
t-stat p-value 
B Std. error Beta 
Constant .318 .078  4.060 .000
Governance variable:     
TOTCOM –.001 .001 –.163 –2.076 .039
Control variables:     
LEV .169 .029 .426 5.916 .000
SIZE –.024 .011 –.198 –2.230 .027
ABSNIBE –.061 .029 –.175 –2.134 .034
ABSCH .074 .025 .210 2.984 .003
PBR .012 .004 .228 3.185 .002
 R2                              .276    
 F statistics   11.115  
 p-value            .000  
 
6 CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
This study used a quantitative analysis approach and hypothesised that higher levels of 
compliance with corporate governance principles and recommendations, would be associated 
with lower levels of discretionary accruals. The modified Jones model was adopted as a 
measure to estimate discretionary accruals. Data relating to compliance with ACCG-PR were 
collected directly from corporate governance statements within the annual financial reports of 
sample companies. Other financial data were collected from an external secondary source 
(the Bloomberg database). Although compliance with the ACGC-PR are not mandatory, 
Australian listed companies are required to prepare corporate governance statements 
disclosing the extent of their compliance and to explain the circumstances underpinning their 
decisions not to follow the ACGC-PR. 
 
The study hypothesis is supported by the data, that is, higher levels of compliance with 
ACGC-PR are associated with lower levels of earnings management. The five control 
variables that are tested in the current study are size, leverage, the absolute value of net 
income before extraordinary items, the price to book ratio of equity and the absolute changes 
in income. Findings demonstrate that all control variables are significantly associated with 
the levels of discretionary accruals. The results reveal that larger companies exhibit higher 
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levels of compliance with ACGC-PR and will exhibit lower levels of discretionary accruals. 
Leverage is also positively associated with the level of discretionary accruals. 
 
In this study, discretionary accruals is measured using a modified Jones model and a cross-
sectional approach is used. The implications of other models for the measurement of 
discretionary accruals are beyond the scope of this study. Some of the requirements of 
Australian corporate governance are already embedded in the listing rules of the ASX and it 
would be useful to control the influence of such requirements on earnings management in 
future studies. One of the aims of good corporate governance is to mitigate residual losses, 
thus future studies examining factors that create residual losses and investigating how 
corporate governance structures can mitigate those factors would also be useful. 
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